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REVIVAL OF A PRIOR BY THE
REVOCATION OF A LATER WILL.

The Statute of Frauds was, at the time of its passage,
evidently thought by English lawmakers to be a complete
and final disposition of all questions relative to the legal
modes and forms for the expression of a man's testamentary
intent. Experience has, however, proved that there are
numerous instances which the statute does not explicitly
cover. The consequence has been the growth of an enormous body of law dealing with the question whether a testator has succeeded legally in doing what he intended to do,that is to say, whether his testamentary intent can be considered, in view of the condition or form in which he has
left the evidence of such intent. Most of the uncertainties
and omissions in the Statute of Frauds have been cured in
England by the Wills Act of Ist Victoria, C. 26, which has
greatly simplified the law of wills and done much to reduce
it to a clear and uniform code both as to realty and personalty.
One of the cases not dealt with by the Statute of Frauds
is that which arises where two or more wills exist.
l
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revoking the earlier, and the later is itself eoked. The
statute is silent as to the result of such revocation upon
former wills. Its framers were careful to provide how a
will might be revoked, but failed to provide any method
for the revocation of a revocation. This was probably due
to the fact that it was considered that a revocation of a
revocation was itself really a new testamentary act. If it
had been so considered from the first, all difficulty would
have been removed. As it is, however, the question of
revival of an earlier will by the destruction or other revocation of a later will is involved in much contradi~ion and
conflict. Th courts of different jurisdictions seem to have
taken every conceivable vieo._he matter and it can
h
be said that there is any doctrine which carries with
it the decided weight of authority.
"Tflie matter-has been settled in England by the statute of
Ist Victoria, C. 26, Sec. 22 (1837), which provides "that
no will or codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be in any
way revoked, shall be revived otherwise than by the reexecution thereof, or by a codicil executed in manner
hereinbefore required, and showing an intention to revive
the same."
We shall have occasion to refer again to the statute, and
shall take up the problem first, irrespective of it and similar
American enactments.
The facts in a general way, as to which we are to ascertain the law, are these: A makes his will; subsequently he
makes a will which revokes the former one, either because
it is inconsistent therewith or because it contains an express
revocation of former wills. Ie then destroys this second
will or otherwise revokes it. What effect has his action on
the prior will which is still in existence?
The question appears to have been first raised in England
in Chancery in the case of Ex parte HIellier,' where it
was decreed that the cancellation of the second will did not
set up the first. Sir George Lee said that the execution of
the second will is a revocation of the first, though the second
be afterwards canceled. This was a case of personal property, and of course the question of the revocation of the

'3 Arkc.

798 (1754).
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first was decided apart from the provisions of the Statute
of Frauds.
The next case arose at common law, and under the
2
Statute of Frauds. It was Goodright & Glazier v. Glazier.
It there appeared that a will was made in 1757; a second in 1763. The former was never canceled; the second
was canceled by the testator. Both wills were in the testator's custody at the time of his death; the second canceled,
the first uncanceled. A verdict in ejectment was given in
favor of the heir-at-law, as against the devisee, who was
devisee in both ivlls. Lord Mansfield, in granting the rule
for a new trial, remarked that in Ex parte Hellier (supra)
Atkins only reported what passed in Chancery and there
might be other circumstances appearing to the Ecclesiastical
Court which might amount to a revocation of a will of personalty. He then went on to say, "Here, the testator has,
by both wills, devised the lands in question to the defendant.
His canceling the second is a declaration 'that he does not
intend that to stand as his will.' Does not that speak, 'that
his first will shall stand?' If he had intended to revoke the
first will when he made the second, it must have operated
as a declaration 'that the defendant should not take.' But
that could not be his intention; because he devises to the
defendant by both."
This reasoning is not very convincing, unless Lord Mansfield went upon the theory that the second will did not
contain any express clause of revocation, and that therefore
it could only be a revocation of the first if it took effect as
a will, namely, if it gave the property to some one else than'
the devisee in the first will, in which case it would of course
supersede it. In accordance with such a view of the case
is the following paragraph from the opinion:
"Here the intention of the testator is plain and clear. A
will is ambulatory till the death of the testator. If the
testator lets it stand till he dies, it is his will; if he does not
suffer it to do so, it is not his will. Here lie had two. He
had canceled the second; it has no effect, no operation; it is
as no will at all, being canceled upon his-death. But the
former, which was never canceled, stands as his will."
24 Burr. 2512 (1770).
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This view may well be taken, if, as stated, the second will
contained no clause of revocation, and several courts have
taken this to be all that was in issue in the case. 3 It is
true that in Burrow's Report no mention is made of an
express clause of revocation in the second will, but in the
report in Buller's Nisi Prius 266, and also in the report in
Lofft, 575, it is said that the second will contained an express
clause of revocation of all former wills. If this be true, then
it appears that Lord Mansfield's reasoning as to the intention of the testator is unsatisfactory, for if the testator
supposed the second will was a complete revocation of the
first, he may have canceled it with the idea and intention of
dying intestate. And such a hypothesis is at least as reasonable as that he intended his former will which he had
declared revoked to be again his will.
Mr. Justice Yeates said "A will has no operation till the
death of the testator. This second will never operated; it
was only intentional. If by making the second he intended
to revoke the former, yet the revocation was itself revocable;
and he has revoked it."
This language seems also to point to a view that the case
was not one of express revocation, or why the words "if he
intended to revoke?" The justice went on to say that
"Hellier's Case (supra) might be rightly determined; there
might be collateral evidence of an intention to revoke."
Both this language and that of Lord Mansfield (supra)
seem to indicate that the court thought the ascertainment of
intention important as bearing on the question of the revival
_9of the former will.
Justice Yeates then quoted the Statute of Frauds that "no
devise in writing of lands, . . . shall be revocable
otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing, or
other writing declaring the same, or by burning it; but all
devises and bequests of lands, . . . shall remain and
continue in force until the same be burned, etc.; or unless
the same be altered by some other will or codicil in writing
or other writing of the devisor, signed in the .presence of
three or four witnesses, declaringthe same." He said, "Now
$James v. Marvin, 3 Conn. 576 (1821); 'Colvin v. Warford, 2o Md.
.357 (1863).
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here are none of these circumstances used in what is pretended to be a revocation of this first will. Therefore the
first will stands good." Quwre, does this mean that the
Justice understands that the second will contained no
declaration (which word he italicizes) of a revocation, or
does he mean that whether it contains such declaration or
not, it can never be operative as a revocation till the death
of the testator?
The above quotations and comments show how uncertain
it is, exactly what was intended to be decided in this case.
The court seems to intimate that the intent of the act of cancellation is important; it is not clear whether the revocation
was express, or sought to be implied merely from certain inconsistencies in the two wills. It is hardly a case from
which to deduce broad legal principles.
The same observations apply to the dictum of Lord Mansfield in Harwood v. Goodright,4 where he says "it is settled,
that if a man by a second will revoked a former, yet, if he
keep the first will undestroyed, and afterwards destroy the
second, the first will is revived." This was not a case of
express revocation, but merely of alleged inconsistency in
the two wills.
' The same judge delivered a contrary dictum in Burtonshaw v. Gilbert.5 That was a case of trespass. Plea,
justification under authority of X, surviving devisee of the
lands in question under the will of G dated 1759. Issue on,
the validity of said will. G made a will in 1759. He afterwards said it was not to his liking, and made a new will in
1761, with different dispositions of his property and an
express clause of revocation of former wills. The will of
179'was in duplicate, and the duplicate which G had at the
time of making that of 1761. was torn up by his order. The
other duplicate was in the hands of a devisee. He afterwards sent to his solicitor for the will of 1761, and on his
death it was found canceled. The evidence showed that he
had a few days before his death sent for a solicitor to make
him a new will. The other duplicate of the will of 1759,
above mentioned, was found uncanceled in his room with
4

Cowper, 87, 91 (1774).
'Cowper, 49 (1774).
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other papers. Held, he died intestate. Lord Mansfield: "He
. . . . executes it (his intention to do away with his
former will) by a new will in 176r, which is a complete,
legal and effectual will; and if he had died immediately
after, whether he had canceled the former or not, it would
have been revoked; because at the end of the second will
there is a declaration by which he revokes all former wills."
He then goes on to hold that the cancellation is also sufficient to revoke finally the will of 1759 and put it beyond
possibility of revival. Mr. Justice Aston concurred on the
latter ground.
The above language shows that the revocation by the
later__will was looked upon as an executed act. If it is so,
it is hard to see how it can be itself rescinded on the ground
that it is put in a will which is.ambulatory. Either Lord
Mansfield contradicts himself or he decided Goodright v.
Glazier on the ground that the second will in that case contained no express revocation.
The case of Goodright v. Glazier has, it is said,8 established the doctrine that, at common law the revocation of a
revoking will revives the prior revoked will. This is said to
result by law; it is not a presumption and proof to the contrary is not receivable. And it makes no difference whether
the revoking will is such by virtue of an express revocatory
clause therein contained or because it contains dispositions
of property inconsistent with those of the prior will. And
this, in spite of the language used in the case relative to testator's intention; for certainly the court thought an inquiry
into the intention of testator important enough to discuss it
and to reach a conclusion which they thought in accordance
with his intention.
The Ecclesiastical Courts have not followed the seeming
trend of Ex parte Hellier (supra) in holding that the presumption is adverse to a revival. Such seemed at first to be
their attitude, but it early came to be settled that there was
no presumption either in favor of or adverse to a revival.
It was said to be a pure question of intention, .and such
i Jarm., Wills, 136 (Fourth Edition); i Wms., Executors (Fifth
American Edition), 154-156. But see Powell, Devises (Second Edition),

526.
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intention was to be gathered from any circumstances in
the case.7 This view of the law, at least, has the mierit of
getting at the justice of a case. Whether it can be sustained
under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds as to revocation, we shall discuss later.
Turning, now, to the American law, we find that the
Statute of Frauds, with respect to wills, has bTeen substantially adopted in almost all the states. The modifications
when there are any, in most instances are a reduction in the
number of witnesses required in the execution of a will.
A number of states have legislation.bearing on the precise question at issue. Virginia has adopted the Statute 0-f
i Victoria, C. 2-6, Section 22, bodily,8 so that in that state
a revival of the prior will, upon destruction of the revoking
one, can only be accomplished by a re-execution. 9
Alabama, 10 California,11 Kentucky, 12 Missouri,1 3 and
New York 14 have statutory provisions almost identical in
T
In Moore v. De La Torre, I Phillim. 375 (I86), Sir John Nicholl
said: "If it were necessary to decide the point, I should hold that it was
not the presumption when B was canceled that A should revive." In
Moore v. Moore, i Phillim. 406 (t817), the Court of Delegates was
much pressed with Lord Mansfield's decision in Goodright v. Glazier,
and seemed dissatisfied with it; they refused to addlt it. "The clear
result of all the cases, the common-sense of them, is that it must be
ascertained whether it was or was not the intention of the deceased
that the will should stand." Hooton v. Head, 3 Phillim. 26, 32 (I819),
per Sir John Nicholl. See also Wilson v. Wilson, 3 Phillim. 543, 554
(I82); Usticke v. Bawden, 2 Add. ii6, 125 (1824) ;Welch v. Phillips,

i Moore P. C. 299 (1836) ; James v. Cohen, 3 Curt. 770 (1844).

Since the Wills Act i Victoria, C. 26, Sec. 22, a will of personalty,
like one of realty, cannot be revived by the destruction or revocation
of a later revoking will: Major v. Williams, 3 Curt. 432 (1843); Saunders v. Saunders, 6 No. Cas. 524 (1848).
' Sec. 9, Chap. 118, Code of 1873.
'Rudisill v. Rodes, 29 Gratt. 147 (1877).
"R. C. See. 1933.
1 Code Sec. 1297. In re Lones, io8 Cal. 688; 41 Pac. 771 (I895), held

that a third will, revoking a second, which had in turn revoked a first,
did not revive the first because no such intention appeared on the
face of the will.
" Gen. Stat. C. 113, Sec. iI ; Minor v. Guthrie, S. W. i79 (1887).
"Wagn. Stat. 1366; Beaumont v. Keim, 5o Mo. 28 (1872).
14 2 Rev. Stat., C. 6, Tit. 2, Sec. 53.
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wording,1" and evidently copied from one another, which
provide for the case in question. There is some doubt from
the wording just what is intended, it being said there shall
be no revival "unless it appear by the terms of such revocation that it was his intention to revive." The inquiry suggests itself, Does this mean that in case of a revocation by
burning, tearing, etc., if testator at the time of doing the act
states it to be a revival of his earlier will, that this is effective
to revive it? This question has been answered in the negative in New York.16 X made a will and subsequently made
a revoking will. Afterwards in the presence of witnesses
he tore up the revoking will, saying that he was satisfied
with the old one and would have it. The first will was in
existence undestroyed at his death. Held, that under the
statute there could be no revival without express republication, and the first will was.not revived.
would be hard to imagine a clearer case for revival
short of express republication than. the above, apd, if the
case is followed elsewhere, it means that in these'states the
statute is practically the same as the English Statute of
i Victoria. This seems to be the intent of the enactment,
though it is vague in expression.
The earlier American cases in point were decided in
Pennsylvania.

Lawson v. MorrisoIZ,17 contains dicta which

cover the case. There A made a will in 1775, another in
1777, which he revoked; another in 1779, which was traced

to her possession, but not found after her death. It was
argued that the presumed destruction of the will of 1779
set up the will of 1775. There was no evidence that the will
of 1779 contained a revoking clause or that it was inconsistent with that of 1775. The court held: First, that the
"'The New York statute is given: "If, after the making of any will,
the testator shall duly make and execute a second will, the destruction,
canceling or revocation of such second *ill shall not revive the first
ss it appear by the terms of such revocation that it was his
will
intention to revive and give effect to his first will; or, unless after such
destruction, canceling or revocation, he shall duly republish his will."
"it re Stickney's Will, 52 N. Y. Supp. 929 (1898). See also Ludlam
v. Otis, 15 Hun. 410 (1878).
172 Dall. 286 (792).
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will of 1779 could not be said to be a revoking will, since
its contents were not known to the court;"' second, that the
presumption was thatA herself destroyed the will of 1779 ;19

third, that if this was true, then the will of 1775 stood, for
no one could have a will till he died, and when A died she
had a subsisting wIll -that of 1775; fourth, and this must
be true, unless -it-was dearly proved that A had destroyed
the will of 1779 with intent to die intestate; fifth, McKean,
C. J.,-said: "Should a contrary opinion hold, to wit, that
the first will was revoked at the instant the second was
executed, yet the canceling of the second by the testatrix
herself is a revival of the first if undestroyed. (Citing Harwood v. Goodright.)
Of course, all this is dictum, for the court held there was
no sufficient evidence that the later will was a revoking will.
The court, however, takes a different view from any yet
examined, viz.: that there is a presumption of revival
(whether the revoking will is so, either by reason of inconsistency or express revocation), buftt_ such presumptipn
20
may be met by proof that-testator intended to die intestate.
In Flintham v. Bradford, 1 which was an ejectment, the
question was whether a will of 1821, which had been
revoked by a will made in 1824, has been subsequently
revived by the cancellation of the laterwill, and whether
parol evidence was competent or admissible to rebut the
presumption of an intent to revive. The court helAd the
destruction of the second will revived the first, because a
will is ambulatory till the death of the testator, and rejected
the evidence of intent. Coulter, J., said: "The other rejected
evidence

.

.

.

.

would, in effect, if allowed to pre-

vail, defeat the rule in regard to the effect which the cancellation of a posterior will has -on a prior will preserved by
"See Harwood v. Goodright (supra) ; Freeman v. Freeman, 5 D. M.

& G. 7o4 (1854); Cutto v. Gilbert, 9 Mo. P. C. i3I (1854).
" Brown v. Brown, 8 Ell. & BI. 876 (1858); Finch v. Finch, L. R. i P.

& D. 371; Burns v. Burns, 4 S. & R. 295 (1818); Newell v. Homer,
120 Mass. 277 (1876).
'In Boudinot v. Bradford, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 170 (1797), the court said
that parol evidence was admissible to show quo animo the cancellation
of the second will was done.
Zo Pa. 82 (1848).
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the testator, and would also amount to a revocation by word
of mouth. I will admit that if it clearly proved that the
testator, at the time he canceled the posterior will, intended
to die intestate, but had not the prior will then in his possession or power, so as to annul or destroy it, that such
intent existing at the time of cancellation, and connected
with it, might be given in evidence as part of the res
22

gestm.
This case comes very close to the common-law rule. The

field for evidence of intention is by it very much limited.
The common-law doctrine is adopted in New Jersey. 23
In Massachusetts, in a comparatively late case, Pickens v.
Davis,24 the Supreme Court, with most of the statutes and

decisions before it, has adopted the view that there is a presumption against revival, bqt this presumption may be over-

come b eivence of intent to revive, and has even gone so
far as to hold that declarations of the testator made prior
and subsequent to the revocation of the second will are
admissible to prove the quo animo.25 The court said: "Evidence of declarations made at other times is to be received
with caution. They may have been made for the very purpose of misleading the hearer as to the disposition which
the speaker meant to make of his property."
The Supreme Court of Georgia, 26 in a dictum, has taken
the same view, apparently, though there is an earlier case
which seems somewhat inconsistent with this view. 2 The
same rule appears to prevail in South Carolina.28
Cited with approval, Comm. v. Stauffer, io Pa. 350 (1849).
=Randall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. 643 (1879).
24

134 Mass. 252 (1883).

'See, also, Williams v. Williams, 142 Mass. 515 (1886), where a
testator executed three wills, each containing a revocatory clause, and
each of which he published as his last will. At the time he executed
the third will he said he would keep them all till he made up his mind
which he wanted for his will. He afterwards destroyed the first and
third. Held, that these facts warranted a finding that the testator, in
destroying the third will, intended to revive the second, and it should
be admitted to probate.
" Lively v. Harwell, 29 Ga. 509 (1859).
' Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga. 332 (1857).
Taylor v. Taylor, 2 Nott. & McC. 482 (1820).
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Tennessee seems to have 2adopted
the rule of the Eccle9
siastical Courts of England.
30
It is not clear what rule is followed in North Carolina.
A number of jurisdictions have adopted the rule now
enforced in England, under i Victoria, without any express
statutory provision, founding their decisions on an interpretation of the provisions of the Statute of Frauds as to
revocations.
In Bohanon v. Wolcott,3 ' the facts were that G made a
will in 1829. In 1831 he made a second, expressly revoking all former wills. He afterwards expressed an intention
of revoking his last will and applied to B to write a new
one for him. He handed B the will of 1831, with interlineations and erasures, and declared he had made them and
had done away with that will. G expressed a desire to B
that if the new will should not be published the will of 1829
should go into effect. He died before publishing the new
will. Held, first, The will of 1831 was validly canceled;
second, That of 1829 was not republished. Lord Mansfield's
opinion in Goodright v. Glazier was said not to be sound.
Smith, J., said: "A will is ambulatory, and has no effect
until the death of the testator. If he lets it stand till his
death, it is his will, but if revoked it cannot be. But when
revoked, it cannot be considered as having either a present
or a potential existence, and must require some express and
direct act of the testator, which, in fact, does not revive the
defunct will, but adopts it as the present will of the testator,
and it is to be regarded as a new testamentary act of the
32
party.
In Hawes v. Nicholas,33 probate was asked of an instrument dated 1873. The contestants offered to prove that
testator made and executed, with due formalities, another
will in 1879, in which he expressly revoked all former wills,
and that he afterwards destroyed the same. The contention was that he died intestate. The Texas Statute 4 pro'McClure v. McClure, 86 Tenn. 173 (887).
'Marsh v. Marsh, 3 Jones L. 77 (855).
I How. (Miss.) 336 (1836).
See, also, Colvin v. Warford, 2o Md. 357 (1863).
Tex. 481 (1889).

3372

" R. S., Art. 486r.
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vides for revocation "by a subsequent will, codicil, or
declaration in writing executed with like formalities." The
court declared an intestacy, saying: "A written declaration
properly executed as effectually revokes a will from the
date of its execution as does its destruction. If the purpose
to revoke is sufficiently expressed, and the writing is
properly executed it cannot be controlled or limited by the
name given the instrument or by its containing other provisions."
In Connecticut in the absence of statutory provision as to
revocation the same conclusion was reached.3 5 There was
an express clause of revocation, and it was held that the
destruction of the later will did not revive the former.
Subsequently a statute was passed in Connecticut providing that no will should be revoked except by burning,
etc., "or by a later will or codicil." This differs from the
wording of the Statute of Frauds in omitting the phrase
'or other writing declaring the same." In Peck's Appeal,"6
the court suggested that the aspect of the above question
was changed by the statute, and intimated that under it a
will containing even an express clause of revocation must
take effect as a will before it could have any effect on a
former will. The case was, however, one of implied revocation, because there was no evidence of the existence of an
express clause of revocation in the second will. Except for
this dictum, the authority of James v. Marvin is unimpaired.
The distinction noted between the cases of James v.
Marvin (supra) and Peck's Appeal (supra) as to express
and implied revocations is carried out in Michigan. In
Scott v. Fink3 7 the second will contained an express revoking clause and was burned at the direction of the testator.
It was held that this did not revive the first will,38 and a distinction was drawn between such a case as this and one
where the revocation occurred, because the second will was
inconsistent with the first.
v. Marvin, 3 Conn 576 (182i).
(1883).
45 Mich. 241 (i881).

'James

"5o Conn. 563

,Stevens v. Hope,

52

Mich. 65 (1883).
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In Cheever v. North,39 on application for probate of a
will, evidence was offered of the execution of a second will.
The jury found that the second "made a complete disposition of his estate." There was no evidence and no finding
as to whether the second will contained, in terms, a revocation of the prior will. The court admitted the first will to
probate, holding that while an express revocation operated
instanter to abolish a former will, in such a case as this the
second will must take effect at testator's death to be a revocation of the earlier will.
We have now taken an exhaustive survey of the views of
the various courts on this subject, and it remains merely to
comment briefly upon them. Let us first discuss the case
where an express clause of revocation is inserted in the later
will.
It is believed that the problem really resolves itself into
this question, What is a revocation under the Statute of
Frauds? If a revocation has taken place by the execution.
of the second will, then the revoked instrument can never
be set up again save by certain formalities prescribed by the
statute. If, on the other hand, no sufficient statutory revocation has taken place, the original will has been in full force
all along, and it is rather incongruous t6 speak of the
"revival" of something that has never been dead.
The statute provides certain modes for the revocation of a
will, viz.: First, burning, tearing, etc.; second, another will
or codicil; third, a writing executed with formalities like
those of a will, declaring the same. If any of these requirements are fulfilled the wilt is 'evoked. Let us see how.
The making of a will is a deliberative act; therefore, it is
subject to change up to the time of death; it is the expression
of a future purpose-an intention, and, therefore, during
life, cannot be irrevocable and final. It is executory. On
the other hand, a revocation is executed. It is the expression of a present purpose. If it means anything it means
that a testator has fully and once for all made up his mind
that a given paper does not represent his present wish as to
the final disposition of his property. Now, if the law.
31o6

Mich. 390; 64 N. W. 455 (1895).
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requires him to manifest that wish by certain formalities,
and provides a method for destroying the efficacy of the
formalities he has gone through, why, if he ever wishes to
re-establish such a will, should he not be required again to
manifest his purpose as though no will existed?
It certainly never was contended that after the revocation
iof a will by cancellation the testator could, by a parol
declaration, revoke the cancellation and declare a change of
purpose. It is hard to imagine that any court would hold
that a duly signed and executed paper declaring a revocation could be done away with by any act less than a republication or re-execution of the revoked will. 40 If this is true,
it is because a revocation is an act different in nature from
a mere testamentary disposition.
What, then, gives a clause of revocation, contained in a
will, a different character from any other form of revocation? It is said that it is part of a will, and that the will is
ambulatory, consequently the clause of revocation is ambulatory, and, if ambulatory, it is subject to be abolished at any
time up to the death of the testator. If this be true it can
have no final effect until the death of the testator. Consequently, the prior will remains unaffected until that time. If,
in the meantime, the will containing the clause of revocation
just as it was at the time
is revoked, it leaves the prior will
41
of its execution,---in full force.
Now, either this proposition is true, in which case there
must be a revival as matter of law; or it is false, in which
case there cannot possibly be a revival.
Let us examine the books to determine the opinion of
the courts on this question of the inseparability of the revocatory clause from the rest of the will.
"An express revocation is a positive act of the party,
inddpeifdent of the will which may h.appen to contain it, and
dprating instantaneously and _er se. As a clear consequence"resutmig fiom this principle, all prior wills are
I In Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (1823), it was held that a
contract to convey land which had been devised was a revocation, and
that the devise could not again be set up except by express republication.
1 i Redf. Wills, Sec. 328; Goodright v. Glazier, supra.
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recalled or reversed,-the proper meaning of the word
revoked,-and must remain in this condition until revived
'4 2
by republication.

"A man has power, then, to insert in his will a revocation
that shall be operative, though it turn out that the will itself
shall be inoperative. Having power, a man may, if he
pleases, insert in his will a revocation that shall be operative
' 43
independently of the will."

"But a clause in a subsequent will, which in terms revokes
a previous will, is not only an expression of the purpose to
revoke the previous will, but an actual consummation of it,
and the revocation is complete and conclusive, without
regard to the testamentary provisions of the will contaiving
44
it.",

"If it can be proved that a later will was duly executed,
attested and subscribed, and that it contained a clause
expressly revoking all former wills, but evidence of the rest
of its contents cannot be obtained, it is nevertheless a good
45
revocation."
"The clause of revocation is not necessarily testamentary
in its character. It might as well be executed as a separate
instrument. The fact that it is inserted in a will does not
necessarily show that the testator intended that it should be
dependent on the continuance in force of all the other pro'46
visions by which his property is disposed of."

In the light of these quotations, it does not seem too much
to say that there is no difference between this sort of revocation and any other, and that it is not ambulatory as some
of "tTetaseshave held. 47 If this is so, the revocation is complete, and nothing but a new testamentary act, in the form
prescribed by statute, will suffice to revivify the earlier
will.48

' Hosmer, C. J., James v. Marvin, 3 Conn. 576 (1821).
' Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23 Ga: 332 (857).
"Colvin v. Warford, 2o Md. 357 (1863).
'Gray, C. J., Wallis v. Wallis, ii4 Mass. 5iO (1874).
"Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252 (1883). See also the language
quoted from Bohanon v. Wolcott, supra, p. Hawes v. Nicholas,
supra, p. -.

' Lawson v. Morrison, supra, p. -; Flintharn v. Bradford, supra,
p. -.
I Jarm. Wills (Fourth Edition) 136.
' Bohanon v. Wolcott, supra, p. -; Scott v. Fink, supra, p. -.
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It is believed that either one of two positions is inevitable;
that there is a revocation and no revival; or no revocation,
and the former will remains unimpaired. Nevertheless,
some courts have, as we have seen, taken cognizance of the
intention of the testator, for or against the revival. This
may be well enough where no statutory method of revocation.i&aprescribed, and where no formality is necessary to
the making of a will, but if a will is revoked by a clause
inserted in a later will, then it is gone. However much the
testator may intend to set it up again by destroying the
revoking will, his intention can have no effect, and a court
should not hear evidence of intention, for the statute provides that no testamentary intent is sufficient unless
evidenced in certain ways. On this ground such cases as
Pickens v. Davis49 and Wallis v. Wallis"0 seem to be illconsidered.
On the other hand, if the second will is no revocation, its
destruction as matter of law must leave the first in force, and
the fact that testator said he did not intend it to be in force,
but intended to die intestate, cafinot alter the status of the
first will. The statute provides against the revocation of
wills by word of mouth, and it nowhere provides that the
cancellation of a revoking will, with intent to die intestate,
shall revoke a former will. Therefore, evidence of intent
is immaterial and irrelevant here. On this ground Flintham
v. Bradford1 seems to be erroneous.
A very different question is raised where the second will
contains no clause of revocation, but simply devises the property in a different manner from the first. In such a case, if
the second will takes effect upon the death of the testator,
the first cannot, and, of course, the second does, take effect
as being the expression of the testator's latest intent. Many
of the cases 52 recognize this distinction, which is very well
brought out in the Michigan cases. 8 . In fact, the Michigan
, Supra, p.
Supra, p.
" Supra, p. -.
92 James v. Marvin, supra, p. -;
Bohanon v. Wolcott, supra, p.

Colvin v. Warford, supra, p. -.

" Scott v. Fink, supra, p. -; Cheever v. North, supra, p.-.
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Supreme Court takes the most logical and consistent view of
the problem, and the one which, it is submitted, ought to
prevail in jurisdictions where the Statute of Frauds or
similar enactments are in force, and where there is no such
statute as i Victoria, C. 26, Sec. 22. It would tend greatly
to simplification of the now hopeless confusion, were all the
states to follow the lead of England and the states heretofore mentioned,5 4 by direct legislation covering the point in
controversy. The statute of i Victoria was suggested by
long experience in England, and has been found quite satisfactory in its operation.
Owen I. Roberts.
Philadelphia,August i, i9oo.

"Supra, p.

-.

